William Katz:  Urgent Agenda

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FROM THE HOTTEST FRONT - AT 8:15 A.M. ET:  Whenever possible, Urgent Agenda tries to develop private, trustworthy sources.  The following is from an American traveler to Afghanistan, very knowledgeable and well-connected, who reports on the reality on the ground in a conflict that is one of the main elements of Obama's foreign policy:

I think visitors to this theater are immediately struck by the lack of coherence in our message and in our strategy. There are so many power brokers, so many voices, so many players, that it is hard to quickly discern the overarching campaign plan that will lead us to success.

This is NOT McKiernan's fault.  It is due to a command structure here that is disfunctional because of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)/NATO imperatives. We lack unity of command and unity of effort. McKiernan has tried heroically to generate these through a variety of means, but the nature of coalition warfare creates dissension, back-channeling, passive resistance to orders, and a variety of strategic/operational goals among the suborinate commands.

The civilian side of the civ-mil approach to COIN (counter-insurgency) is even more fractured.  Who is the lead?  Who speaks for all?  Who makes the tough decisions and makes them stick?

The Obama administration had NOT solved the problem by putting in a strong military leader, a strong US ambassador, and a strong regional ambassador. The fundamental problem is that we are trying to prosecute an American war through a NATO apparatus.  One or the other
is going to have to change significantly...shuffling the leadership does nothing to address the systemic, structural problems of the C2 system here.

Some important questions to be answered:

1.  Is NATO still the lead?  If not, key players may depart.
2.  If NATO is still the lead, have they embraced the AF-PAK (Afghan-Pakistan) strategy?  Pakistan presents a whole new set of challenges that some of the partners are not eager to tackle.
3.  How will (incoming commander, U.S. Army Lieutenant General) Stanley McChrystal be received by an ISAF headquarters that is not necessarily dominated by the US?
4.  Where is (U.S. Army Lieutenant General David Rodriguez) going? What is his role?  Has NATO agreed to this new role?

Bottom line...McKiernan's departure is change for change's sake.  He fully understands COIN doctrine and knows the population is the center of gravity and must have the confidence to step forward and reject the insurgents.  He didn't have the troops to do this for most of his tour,
and the troops he did have did not necessarily share his vision.  He also did not have a strong civilian counterpart who could galvanize the international community players that dominate the diplomatic scene in Kabul.

We have changed the leaders.  But what really must change are the organizational dynamics.

COMMENT:  From the horse's mouth.

May 18, 2009